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AN EPISODE IN CANON LAW. 
THE paper 1 from which this article is condensed was mainly 
designed as a protest against the not infrequent habit of treating 
the ideals of an age apart from its practice. This, like most 
historical obliquities, is not characteristic of one party only. 
The man who is interested in nothing but " facts " forgets some- 
times that religious, social and political ideals are among the 
most real and insistent facts in history, which must be frankly 
faced, even if they are finally to be explained away. On the 
other hand, the temptation to regard nothing but ideals springs 
not only from apologetic considerations, but also from an economic 
nexus from which even the most disinterested historians are 
seldom free. A theory can often be learned in five minutes, and 
stated in half-a-dozen lines; whereas it might take us years of 
research to explore the corresponding practice, and even more 
trouble to present it in its due perspective, without undue 
exaggeration on either side, Therefore to stress those statements 
of theory which we can so easily pick up, and to neglect those 
thousand modifications which might suggest themselves if we 
looked oftener at  our subject from different angles, is a distortion 
of truth the more mischievous precisely because it is so natural 
and almost inevitable, The worst deceptions are those which 
are conventionally ignored because most people are tempted to 
ignore them. 
Theory and Practice, after all, are Faith and Works ; and we 
all know the lamentable results of attempting to separate those 
two logically separable elements, at any time or in any place. 
But in the Middle Ages, especially, there were gulfs everywhere 
between theory and practice more startling even than the gulfs 
which are found to-day. Theory came more directly from the 
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Bible than now; while practice was among men whose not 
remote ancestors had run wild in the forests of Central Europe 
or scoured the seas as buccaneers. The system which finally 
broke down a t  the Reformation was a class-dictatorship as 
absolute in theory, and sometimes almost as absolute in practice, 
as that of Bolshevist Moscow ; a class-dictatorship which many 
of the early Reformers so far recognised that they strove to sub- 
stitute for it a similar class-dictatorship of their own. These 
medieval class-dictators held certain economic theories ; how 
did those theories work? This, I contend, is the main, though 
not the only question-the question of practical success. In  
so far as the medieval church succeeded, it lies upon the champion 
of modern society to prove that modern circumstances are not 
such as to promise a repetition of that success. In  so far as they 
failed, it  lies upon the champion of medieval society to show that 
this failure sprang from circumstances more or less peculiar to 
those times or places. 
The one essential distinction between medieval and ancient 
thought is in the Christian conviction that man has a soul to 
save; therefore, that the one end of all theory and practice in 
this world is to arrive at salvation in the next, and to help others 
to that salvation. Gibbon, from one point of view, rightly pil- 
lories Tertullian’s boast that the Christian artisan will give a 
confident answer to questions which had beaten the heathen 
philosophers ; but he misses another very important point. 
It was a real advance for the world that these thousands of 
ignorant folk should be stirred to think seriously at all; the 
first step towards any truth is to take a real interest in the 
problem. This conviction of the overwhelming importance of 
a choice between eternal salvation and eternal damnation did 
very deeply colour the medieval theories of industry and com- 
merce. Roman imperial law had treated bargaining as a matter 
of competition : sell as dear and buy as cheaply as you can; all 
is fair, short of actual cheating. Medieval church law (and state 
law as influenced by it) acted not so much on the principle 
“ Each look after himself,” as upon “ Each look after his neigh- 
bow ” ; <‘ do unto others aa ye would they should do unto you.” 
At fir&, this waa taken in a very extreme sense; Sir William 
Ashley quotes very strong sayings from Tertullian, Jerome, and 
St. Augustine : St. A u p t i n e  even pleads, “ Business is in itself 
an evil, for it t u r n  men from seeking true rest, which is God.” 
Even more interesting, perhaps, is the passage attributed to 
St. Chrysostom, which I think Sir William does not quote, and 
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which was incorporated in Canon Law by Gratian (Decretum, 
Par. I. dist. 88, cap. 11) : “ Whosoever buyeth a thing, not 
that he may sell it  whole and unchanged, but that it may be a 
material for fashioning something, he is no merchant. But the 
man who buyeth i t  in order that he may gain by selling it again 
unchanged and as he bought it, that man is of the buyers and 
sellers who are cast forth from God’s temple.” In  other words, 
you may buy raw material for your work ; but to buy the finished 
article for trade is sinful, and only one degree worse than usury. 
This, after all, follows logically from St. Paul; if no Christian 
may go to law with his fellow-Christian, then there can be no 
extensive trade between Christian and Christian. But the 
Church gradually receded from this impossible position ; pro- 
hibition gave way to regulation, and there grew up the theory of 
the just price : i. e. a price which enables the seller just to keep 
up that household which his state of life, whatever it may be, 
on the average requires. Anything beyond that, is sinful 
superfluity; and any trade which brings a man more than that 
is unlawful trade. That was the ideal of the whole later Middle 
Ages; an ideal, it  may be freely confessed, which we did wrong 
ever to lose sight of altogether. To divorce political economy 
from ethics is as unscientific as the divorce between any other 
two sciences. But medieval practice fell far short of this ideal. 
While the gild system aimed at enforcing the just price, it  brought 
other injustices in its train ; gild morality, at  the best, was that 
of loving your friend within the gild and hating your enemy 
outside it. And corresponding attempts to regulate wages (as 
we know from the Statute of Labourers) were similarly two- 
edged. On this point there is an extraordinary misstatement in 
Dr. G. O’Brien’s Essay on Mediewtl E c o m i c  Teaching (p. 122). 
He writes : “ In  the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries there is 
little to be found [in the theorists] bearing on the subject [of 
the fair price]. . . . The reason for this paucity of authority 
upon a subject of so much importance is that . . . the proper 
remuneration of labour was so universally recognised as a duty, 
and so satisfactorily enforced, that it seems to have been taken 
for granted, and therefore passed over, by the writers of the 
period.” It would be difficult to find a plainer instance of the 
danger of studying theory alone (for this Dr. O’Brien frankly 
confesses in his preface) and of deducing from this one-sided 
evidence all sorts of wider inferences as to actual practice. Let 
me go on to illustrate this by a concrete case, which seeme 
specially illuminating for all sides of medieval life. Fortunately, 
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the legal and moral issue involved is very simple, which not only 
means that we who are neither legists nor casuists can follow it 
clearly, but also gives far more significance to the almost in- 
credible official uncertainties on this very plain and simple issue, 
as I hope ybu will see from the facts when they come before you. 
To lend, expecting anything beyond your principal, is sinful ; 
that is the plain foundation of medieval church law, adopted 
more or less willingly, more or less sincerely, by the state. But, 
obviously, to  be paid for your labour in making capital fructify 
is legitimate; that labour deserves the same reward as any other 
labour. An active partnership is therefore justified; A and B 
put certain moneys into a concern at which they work together ; 
no casuist, so far as I know, denied the justice of dividing the 
profits in proportion to the capital (caete~U paribus), any more 
than they denied a proportional reward for the labour. Active 
partnership, therefore, is moral, but how about a sleeping partner ? 
The commonest and most obvious case was that of a shipman’s 
venture. You lend him El00 to trade with on his next voyage, 
and he engages to give you a proportionate share in his profits 
minus a commission for his actual labour, wear and tear of ship, 
etc. Later 
medieval doctrine was definite enough on this point; a clear and 
logical distinction was drawn. If this f 100 is subject to the same 
risks as all the shipman’s rn money, ship, etc., so that you may 
find that you have not only received no profits, but that you 
have lost all or part of your capital, that is no usury, but fair 
partnership. If, however, you stipulate on repayment of your 
capital in any case, then you are usurer. In  that case, you 
are taking a breed from barren money; in the other case, your 
risk is equivalent to labour, and you may justly charge for it. 
The apostles and the early fathers would doubtless have dis- 
allowed the distinction, or would only have allowed it as a 
distinction between bad and less bad. But, if the Christian was 
to conform to the world at all, if any d u a  vivendi was to be 
found between trade and Christianity, few theories could be 
clearer or more logical than this. Yet so obscure was this 
question, in spite of its simplicity in theory and its insistency in 
practice for at  least 160 years, that apparently even the Popes of 
the mid-thirteenth century had not made up their minds on the 
subject; and certainly the distinguished saint had not who did 
most for canon law in that generation. Prom the mere point 
of view of literary history, this ia one of the most illuminating 
medieval stories that I know ; and its full significance seems to 
Is this fair partnership, or is it simply covert usury ? 
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be missed not only by Ashley and Lea, but by Neumann, although 
he has devoted a long note to  the subject. 
After Gratian’s Decretum in 1142, the next step in the 
formation of Canon Law was the so-called Daretales Gregorii, 
a collection of papal pronouncements drawn up by St. Raymund 
of Peiiaforte, between 1230 and 1234, by command of Gregory IX, 
himself a distinguished canonist. I n  this collection, the case 
is specifically dealt with ; a decision of Gregory’s own is quoted 
as defining the exact law. This is called the decretal Naviganti 
(all decretals are thus called after their first word or words); 
and i t  runs as follows (Decret. Greg. L. V., tit. xx. c. 19) :- 
“ T h e  man who lends a certain sum of money to  another 
who is undertaking a sea-voyage or about to  visit a fair, on 
the terms that [or, for the reason that, eo quodl he takes the risk 
upon himself, and is to receive anything beyond his bare capital- 
that man is to be adjudged a usurer. He also who [another case 
is quoted] is not on that account to be held as a usurer.” 
This is entirely in harmony with earlier traditions. Here, 
for instance, is a quotation from the old English treatise on 
Vices and Virtues, compiled about A.D. 1200 for the instruction 
of the reading laity and the lower clergy (E.E.T.S., 1888, p. 78). 
The author is commenting on Ps. xiv. 5 (Vulg.) : “ He that putteth 
not out his money to usury ” ; and he writes :- 
“ Some lend [their money] to their fellow-Christian for half- 
gain, who travels with i t  by land and by water in great danger 
of life and soul, and with great toil, and they themselves sit at 
home and have no trouble for it, except in their thoughts and 
speeches. Clerics and laymen see and hear this; but through 
the evil custom it seems to them no misdeed, but those are 
esteemed wise and crafty men. . . . Therefore is [a man] now 
esteemed a fool, except he gets much property; and those who 
get much property by your great property, them ye justify and 
say that they be worthy men and good men.” 
So far, then, it is plain enough : the Pope decides in 1230 
as sound moralists were deciding a generation earlier, and as 
we may find their earlier predecessors deciding even more 
emphatically. How we are to  reconcile this with the fact that, 
for a long time now, there had been trading ventures on a great 
scale from the Mediterranean ports and a few others, and on 
middling scale from other ports, is a different question. The 
Pope condemns it as unchristian, and this is what mere legal 
precedent would lead us to expect. But, if we look more closely 
a t  the wording of his decrees, we find startling difficulties. 
72 HISTOEY [JULY 
First, we should expect in logic not eo quod at all, but etsi, 
“ even though.” Secondly, if we are to take eo p u d  in its most 
natural sense, the phraae certainly conflicts with ugurarius est 
censendus. A man may conceivably be a usurer in spite of his 
accepting the risk of losing his capital; he cannot possibly be 
condemned hy reason that he takes that risk. And, thirdly, most 
remarkable of all, the concluding sentence of the next case, 
“ h e  aZso . . . Is not a usurer,” conflicts flatly with the con- 
clusion of the first case, “ he is a usurer.” Yet Neumann, 
who discusses the passage at length,’ is apparently unable to  
quote a single manuscript which would relieve us of our double 
difficulty, doctrinal and grammatical, by reading ‘‘ usurarius non 
est censendus ”-“ if the man actually risks his money, then he 
is not usurious.” In  spite of that, Neumann contends that non est 
must be the true reading. It would be difficult, I think, to find 
any palmological precedent for such a claim as this. Next to 
the Bible, the Corpus Juris Canonici, of which the Decretales 
&ego& form part, was the standard book of the later Middle 
Ages. Archbishop Arundel, in 1408, decreed for the province of 
Canterbury-and Lyndwood, whose book became authoritative 
for both provinces, repeated in 1430, although the Council 
of Constance had given him every chance of deciding otherwise 
if he had wished it-that the man who disputes or falsely inter- 
prets a Papal decree or decretal is ips0 fact0 a heretic.3 This 
being so, is it credible that the text itself should have become 
so corrupt-if not in the lifetime of the actual Pope who pub- 
lished the decree, at least in the lifetime of the saint who at 
that Pope’s command embodied the decree in Canon Law-is 
it credible that it should have become so corrupt as to read 
in so many words, This is usury (and therefore mortal sin), 
where the Pope had really decreed with equal brevity and 
distinctness, This is not usury? And, even if that were credible, 
must we still further suppose that none of the numerous com- 
mentators, men of great legal learning, noticed this nonsense ; 
that no succeeding Pope had his attention drawn to this case 
in which the Church had recorded a categorical yes by mistake 
for a categorical no-for there again Arundel assures us that the 
voice of a decretal is the voice of the Church ? Can we believe 
that the Church has so pronounced in a case of literally daily 
occurrence, and that no ecclesiastic of rank sees the blunder, 
no lawyer sees it, no interested yet pious trader begs to be 
1 Gach. d. Wuchem in Deutechland (Helle, 1865), pp. 17-18. 
Ed. Oxon, 1679, p. 297. 
192 11 A N  EPISODE IN UANON LAW 73 
assured that what he is doing as part of his daily business is 
approved by the Church as legitimate partnership, and not 
condemned as mortal sin? That, of the tens of thousands of 
clergy whose duty it was to excommunicate all usurers solemnly 
from their pulpits, with bell, book and candle, twice or thrice 
a year, not one enquired whether he was mistakenly consigning to 
hell some most respected member of his congregation? Are we 
to suppose that this substitution of plain black for plain white, 
through a single scribal error, went on uninterruptedly for three 
centuries, until Scaccia a t  last suggested a simultaneous solution 
of the moral and the grammatical difficulty by assuming that 
Gregory had really written non at, where all the MSS. make 
him say plain at? It seems too great a demand upon our 
credulity, even when we are reminded that these three centuries 
were mainly medieval centuries. Yet I must confess that, after 
many heart-searchings, even before meeting with Neumann’s 
argument, I had come, on purely grammatical grounds, to the 
conclusion that Something very like this had occurred; and the 
study of other medieval authorities whom Neumann does not 
cite has only strengthened my conviction. It seems an instance 
of those truths which are stranger than fiction. 
Raymund of Pefiaforte, after compiling this book of Decretals 
for Gregory, wrote a treatise dealing compendiously with all 
thc main questions of Canon Law ; a treatise which had special 
vogue among the Dominicans, of which order he was Minister 
General, and which was reprinted at Paris as a useful guide for 
confessors at  least as late as 1720, perhaps later still. I n  this 
(Bk. 11. tit. vii. c. 5 ,  p. 210) he puts the question more plainly. 
“ A man lends a certain sum of money to another about to take 
a sea-journey and to go to a fair, on the terms that he shall 
receive something beyond the bare capital in consideration of 
the fact that he takes the risk upon himself ; that is, if the other 
bring back safely the money or the goods bought therewith; 
otherwise he [the merchant] shall not be bound to him [the 
lender] even for the capital sum.” Then, giving a similar case, 
in which also the lender takes the same risk, Raymund writes : 
“ Is he, in this and similar cases, committing usury? To this, 
some men answer, no ”-and he gives their argument, which is 
very perilous and illogical. I ‘  But others,” he proceeds, ‘ I  have 
decided on the other side, and more truly, that this transaction 
is usurious.” These ‘ I  others ” base their arguments for yes on 
the same text of Gregory the Great which the first-mentioned 
lawyers try to pervert into a no. I ‘  Moreover,” concludes 
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Raymund, ‘‘ the transaction seems to be carried on in fraudulent 
evasion of the prohibition of usury-in fraudem usurarum-and 
judgment has been given in our own day in the decretal Navi- 
ganti ”-i.e. that same decretal of Gregory IX which Raymund 
himself had embodied in Canon Law. 
This is remarkable enough ; the Pope has categorically decided ; 
his decision has almost a Biblical authority; yet “ others ” 
think otherwise ; and even Raymund, the papal secretary, 
thinks the question worth discussing. Moreover, the great 
encyclopedist of the Middle Ages, Vincent of Beauvais, was 
Raymund’s contemporary and a fellow-Dominican. Writing, 
at  most, only a few years later, he simply quotes from the Summa 
Raymundi (acknowledging his ect obligation, and adding a 
quotation from the decretal Naviganti, in which, however, eo 
pod  now appears as pro eo quod).l And he adds a marginal 
summary : “ A lender who receives anything beyond his principal 
on account of the risk which he accepts seems to commit usury.” 
He too, therefore, treats the Papal decree as disputable, though 
he agrees with Raymund in deciding for it. But a third of 
these Dominican contemporaries, and the greatest of all, decides 
quite clearly in the other direction. Aquinas deals fully with 
the question in his Summa TheolocJica (2s 2m, Q.  78, art. 2). 
He concludes : “ He who commits his money to a merchant or 
an artificer by way of partnership doth not transfer the ownership 
[dominium] of the money to him, but it remaineth his own; so 
that the merchant tradeth therewith, or the artisan worketh there- 
with, at the lender’s peril; therefore the lender can lawfully 
demand his share in the accruing gain as in a thing which is his 
own.” Dr. O’Brien comments truly on this (p. 207) : “ This 
dictum of Aquinas was the foundation of all later teaching 
on partnership.” It is perfectly true that, on this point, he 
laid down a principle which became classical and was scarcely, 
if at all, questioned by the great canonists. But this only 
deepens the mystery : the question is now decided for all Catholic 
history ; it is the classical Catholic doctrine of to-day ; yct it is 
in flat contradiction to the decretal of one of the greatest 
medieval Popes, solemnly embodied in Canon Law. 
If the explanation which I shall now hazard seems to demand 
a strong effort of imagination, may I plead that the facts them- 
selves are sufficiently startling, and that scarcely any explanation 
can so tax our faith aa Neumann’s, which I believe to be the 
accredited theory among modern Catholics ? 
Spec. Doct. lib. x. 0. 108 (ad 1624, 001. 06). 
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When Gregory IX set himself to decide that case, all pre- 
cedent, I think, was in one direction. I am not aware that any 
responsible authority had justified in theory this taking of a 
share for profits which the borrower had earned by labour and 
risk, but the lender by his risk only. It is true, very respectable 
pactice could be pleaded in its justification ; but that is a very 
different thing. In  1206 Innocent 111, in a letter to the Arch- 
bishop of Genoa, expressly advised that in certain cases a dowry 
“ should be committed to some merchant,” so that an income 
might be derived “ by means of honest gain ” (Ashley, p. 419). 
Dr. O’Brien, forgetting his promise to deal only with themy, quotes 
this piece of practice in order to prove that “ the legitimacy of 
the profits of the commendator [the sleeping partner who shares 
the risk] never seems to have caused the slightest difficulty to the 
canonists” (p. 207). We have seen that it caused the greatest 
possible difficulty ; and, in any case, this process of arguing from 
a bare fact to theory is even more dangerous than Dr. O’Brien’s 
usual practice of arguing from theory to fact. One of the worst 
abuses of the Middle Ages was the favouring of Jews by great 
lords who, directly or indirectly, reaped great gain from the 
usury practised by these outcasts. Plain moralists knew per- 
fectly well that this was mortally sinful; sometimes they even 
pointed out that  the Pope himself could not give a dispensation 
for a practice so essentially sinful; 1 yet it was notorious that 
Popes and prelates were among the chief protectors of these 
Jews. It is idle, therefore, to quote Papal practice in proof that 
the commendator had been justified in theory; certainly, when 
Gregory IX  was legislating, the general weight of canonical 
authority was against this; and as yet, I believe, no evidence 
has been brought for a single exceptional favourable decision of 
this kind. 
It was not only that such a Pope as Innocent I11 had thus 
admitted the commenda : but this had become a common practice 
in all busy trading centres since A.D.  1000 a t  leash2 It must 
have seemed absurd to condemn all these respectable merchants 
to hell, and, a t  least by implication, even Innocent I11 and his 
protkg6s. Therefore the original decree ran non at usura: so 
far Neumann is right. But, on the other hand, this hitherto 
unprecedented decision would be almost as shocking to a large 
number of moralists as it would be for the present Pope to 
Yet the question of practice was terribly urgent. 
1 E. g. Summa Angelica, 8.v. Ueura, ij. 5 14. 
of the Franciscan Observantinoa about A.D. 1480. 
* Ashley, Book II., ch. vi. (cd. 1014, p. 412). 
The author was Vicar-General 
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legitimise the re-marriage of divorced persons. The author of 
Vices and Virtues shows plainly what good traditional Churchmen 
of the better class would have felt about such a Papal concession 
to the growing power of money. The Pope, at the last moment, 
hesitated, struck out the m n ,  but omitted to alter the context. 
Raymund, the witness of his hesitations, could not omit from his 
collection a decretal of such immense topical importance, but 
permitted himself to treat the question to some extent as open. 
Others were encouraged to do the same; St. Thomas Aquinas, 
with his supreme good sense, was encouraged even to decide 
against the decretal, in the interests of philosophic moderation and 
of a modus vivendi with the great and growing merchant classes. 
His solution became olassical ; the decretal Nawiganti was just 
put away, with other similar skeletons, in a cupboard ; and only 
the inconvenient inquisitiveness of the Renascence mind fetched 
it out again. That is what I venture to suggest. 
G. G .  COULTON. 
